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Abstract 
In 2009 David Cameron, the Leader of the British Conservative Party, then in opposition, 
announced that ‘with a Conservative Government, Ofcom1 as we know it will cease to exist’ 
(Tryhorn 2009; Holmwood 2009). He said the United Kingdom’s communications regulator, 
the Office of Communications (Ofcom), would be cut back ‘by a huge amount’ and would 
‘no longer play a role in making policy’. Three years later, with Mr Cameron half-way 
through his term as Prime Minister of a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government, Ofcom’s budget had been cut – broadly in line with savings in the United 
Kingdom’s other public bodies – but it had far from ceased to exist. In fact it had an even 
wider role in regulation. Cameron’s government had asked Ofcom to regulate postal services 
in addition to its existing responsibilities for telecommunications and broadcasting.
2
 The 
British Prime Minister said the regulator’s core functions were ‘essential’ (Leveson Inquiry 
2012h: 50, par. 157). His government regularly asked for policy input from Ofcom and in 
2011 sought advice on how to handle issues of media plurality (Department for Culture 
Media and Sport 2011). Understanding how such a sudden political change of heart came 
about provides a case study into an issue which goes far beyond the United Kingdom’s shores 
– how political leaders, rather than submit to demands from news organizations for the de-
regulation of their activities, may find that regulators are, in fact, a useful buttress against 
media pressure.  
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The policy background 
In policy pronouncements over the past twenty years British political parties have 
emphasized the importance of diversity in the news media to the democratic process but have 
rarely reflected it in legislation. Professor Steven Barnett has argued, ‘Thus, despite a policy 
rhetoric which consistently emphasises pluralism, the UK has seen an inexorable shift 
towards a relaxation of ownership restrictions resulting in greater permitted concentrations’ 
(Barnett 8). 
He identified three causes for this policy shift:  
 
increasing financial muscle of global corporations, constantly seeking new expansion and investment 
opportunities; emergence of a dominant free market ideology which has emphasised liberalisation and 
deregulation while opposing state intervention; and a technological convergence of computer, screen 
and print, driven by digitalisation, leading policy-makers to question the efficacy of any cross or intra-
media regulation. 
 
In May 1995 the then Conservative government published proposals on media ownership 
which argued that ‘A free and diverse media are an indispensable part of the democratic 
process […]. If one voice becomes too powerful, this process is placed in jeopardy and 
democracy is damaged’ (Department of National Heritage 1995: 3). 
The proposals called for ownership limits of 20 per cent to be set in the press, TV and 
radio markets and a regulator would be empowered to restrict concentration above these 
thresholds where it was deemed that such concentration of media power would be contrary to 
the public interest.
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But the response from media groups was hostile. Mr Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corporation threatened that its British newspaper business, News International, would close 
one of its newspapers, Today, because it was inflating Murdoch’s market share without 
making any money. The idea of thresholds on individual media markets was dropped,
4
 
although ironically Today was later closed anyway.
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The Conservatives were succeeded by a Labour government which in 1995 similarly 
called for ‘a plurality of voices, giving the citizen access to a variety of views’. But it later 
legislated to relax restrictions on consolidation.  
The Labour Party, then in opposition, had also wanted to restrict the share of the 
newspaper market that any one group could have. This was widely seen as an attempt to limit 
the influence of Rupert Murdoch’s newspapers which had traditionally been hostile to the 
Labour Party.
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This most-quoted example of this hostility was after the 1992 election when Britain’s 
best-selling newspaper, The Sun, carried a front page headline ‘It’s the Sun Wot Won It’ 
claiming that their attacks on the Labour leader, Neil Kinnock, had prevented him winning 
the election.
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It became a conventional political – and media industry – wisdom that this was indeed 
the case. While some academic research suggests that editorial slant can have an impact upon 
elections, other observers take a more cautious line, arguing that such a conclusion is too 
simple. Colin Seymour-Ure, for instance, observed,  
 
clearly it would be absurd to suggest either that the press has no influence over voters at all, or that it 
can manipulate them at will. But the range of possible influences […] is so complex that it makes little 
sense to make such sweeping claims. Even The Sun itself retracted. (1996: 217)
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Nevertheless, Seymour-Ure also noted, ‘How far papers contributed to this volatility and 
shaped voting intentions remained extremely difficult to establish. Party leaders were 
probably wise to assume at least some connection, just in case there was one’ (217). 
Whatever the real power of The Sun, Labour did indeed assume there was some connection 
between its editorial stance and the result of British elections. Rather than try to limit 
Murdoch’s influence they sought to harness it. 
 The Blair strategy: ‘Manage Murdoch’ and empower a regulator 
When one of Mr Kinnock’s successors, Tony Blair, found time in 1995 to fly to an island off 
Australia to speak to the senior global management of Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, 
a further conventional wisdom was established.
9
 This was that because Blair wanted the 
support of Murdoch’s UK newspapers to get elected (he later succeeded on both counts) he 
was prepared to do deals with him over media policy. 
Murdoch’s empire, which already had one-third of the newspaper market, had 
extended into broadcasting and gained management control of the leading pay TV 
broadcaster, British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB). Media ownership rules at the time focused 
on limiting cross-holdings between newspapers and terrestrial television. There were no 
limits on cross-holdings between newspapers and satellite television operators such as 
BSkyB. 
Blair was asked to look back at this era when, in 2012, he appeared before an inquiry 
into the press, which had been set up under Lord Justice Leveson in 2011, which became 
known as ‘The Leveson Inquiry’ (see below).  
Blair admitted that it had been part of his political strategy to get Murdoch’s papers 
‘on board’, but said this did not extend to making deals. ‘I didn’t feel under pressure in 
relation to commercial interests from the Murdoch people, or indeed anyone else’ (Leveson 
Inquiry 2012c: 33). ‘Actually, we decided more stuff against the Murdoch interests than we 
did in favour of it’ (Leveson Inquiry 2012c: 32). 
But Blair was aware of the power of Murdoch and other newspaper groups to inflict 
political damage on his party. He therefore sought to ‘manage’ them. ‘I took the decision – 
and this I’m well aware could be subject to criticism – I took the strategic decision to manage 
this, not confront it, but the power of it is indisputable’ (Leveson Inquiry 2012c: 32). 
Part of the strategy of avoiding confrontation appears to have been to avoid a direct 
collision on media ownership rules. Blair’s government published a consultation paper on 
media ownership rules whose policy rhetoric again emphasized the importance of media 
plurality to British life. ‘Plurality maintains our cultural vitality. A plurality of approaches 
adds to the breadth and richness of our cultural experience.’10 But the legislation which 
followed made no mention of this cultural rationale for controls. There was to be no 
tightening of media ownership rules, if anything the rules were to be loosened.
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Blair was open about this when he looked back in 2012:  
 
I decided I was not going to take this issue on […] I had taken the decision we weren’t going to do a 
big inquiry into cross-media ownership. I thought it would be a distraction for the Labour Party coming 
into office. (Leveson Inquiry 2012c: 43) 
 
If that was the ‘don’t confront’ part of the strategy, there were, however, two counter-
weights to Murdoch’s power – and both involved regulation. Though not specifically cited in 
evidence by Blair, in hindsight these may appear to have been another part of the ‘Manage 
Murdoch’ strategy. 
His government merged seven different content and competition regulators in the 
broadcasting and telecommunications market into one ‘converged’ regulator, the Office of 
Communications or ‘Ofcom’. 
The Communications Act of 2003 gave Ofcom strong powers and the government 
ensured it also had ample resources in order to attract high-quality people who would use 
these powers. The first chairman and the two top executives also happened to be supporters 
of Blair’s government. 
Second, even though Blair’s government had not included new limits on the Murdoch 
empire in the draft bill, a Labour member of the Upper House, the House of Lords, took it 
upon himself to initiate one. As Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee scrutinizing the 
bill Lord (David) Puttnam, negotiated a deal with the government. The full story only became 
known in 2012 when confidential official papers were released to the Leveson Inquiry. 
It was known that the government wanted to lift a statutory restriction which 
prevented News Corporation, as a company with more than 20 per cent of the national 
newspaper circulation, from ever owning the terrestrial television channel, Channel Five. 
Lord Puttnam ran a campaign against this. 
A previously confidential memorandum co-written by the then Media Minister, Tessa 
Jowell, to Blair suggested that a deal could be done with Puttnam. Jowell reported that in a 
conversation with Puttnam he ‘agreed that if we can reach a common position on media 
plurality he will not push the Channel Five amendment’. The deal was done and the ‘public 
interest test’ was born (Leveson Inquiry 2012f: 41).12 
Any proposed media takeover or merger could be referred by the relevant minister to 
Ofcom who would conduct a ‘public interest test’ to decide if it might result in an 
unacceptable diminution of news plurality. This test would be followed, if necessary, by a 
full-scale inquiry by another British regulator, the Competition Commission. After the 
process, the minister could, if he or she wished, block the takeover or merger on the grounds 
that the remaining plurality would be insufficient. But later this test was to assume 
extraordinary political importance. 
 
The Cameron Strategy Number One: The regulator is a problem 
When David Cameron became Leader of the Conservative Party in 2005 he faced almost the 
same problem as Tony Blair had when he was elected Leader of the Labour Party ten years 
earlier. Rupert Murdoch had been supporting the incumbent party for many years, how was 
the opposition party to break this link and win the support of his newspapers? Especially at a 
time when, it was rumoured, Murdoch was apparently not very impressed with the new 
Conservative leader. 
In a 2006 interview with the American broadcaster, Charlie Rose, which was 
broadcast on US Public Television, Rupert Murdoch was asked what he thought of David 
Cameron,  
 
Not much. He’s bright. He’s quick. He’s totally inexperienced. I do not know what substance is there 
or what he really believes. He’s a rich young man, educated at Eton and Oxford […] I would like to 
see, well before the next election, a match up between Brown [Blair’s heir apparent Gordon Brown] 
and the new Conservative leadership and just see how they look. (Wapshott 2006: 18)
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Cameron’s then Press Secretary, George Eustice, now a Conservative Member of Parliament, 
was asked in a 2012 television programme how the first meeting between Cameron and 
Murdoch had gone. 
 
I think it’s difficult to say, I think probably cordial and a little awkward, in that Murdoch wasn’t 
hearing what he wanted to hear and David Cameron probably stood up saying, ‘well I’d no intention of 
telling him what he wanted to hear’ and Rupert Murdoch wasn’t particularly moved by what David 
Cameron was saying about modern compassionate conservatism. (Dispatches 2012) 
 
In 2007, after negative press coverage, Cameron’s press secretary detected a change of 
approach. ‘I think there was a feeling that if we continued to be rather aloof, to keep our 
distance, to disregard and not care about our relations with the media, it would be difficult to 
sustain that’ (Dispatches 2012). Two years later an opportunity arose to form a common 
policy approach between the Conservative leader and News Corporation. 
Rupert Murdoch and his son James, who was now running News Corporation’s 
activities in Europe, had never been supporters of the regulation of British broadcasting. It 
did not fit their ideology. But their concerns became commercial as well as ideological when 
Ofcom decided in June 2009 to intervene in the market for pay-TV sports rights. In order to 
improve competition between rival broadcast platforms, the regulator proposed that BSkyB 
should make its sports channels available for sale to consumers on rival services.
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 BSkyB 
announced that ‘we will use all legal avenues to challenge’ what it called Ofcom’s 
unwarranted intervention (Anon. 2009). The next month, July 2009, David Cameron, whose 
party had privately been neutral-to-positive about Ofcom, took a very publicly negative 
position on the regulator. In a speech titled ‘People Power-Reforming Quangos’ he said that 
his Minister for the Media, Jeremy Hunt, had concluded that  
 
Ofcom currently has many other responsibilities that are matters of public policy, in areas that should 
be part of a national debate, for example the future of regional news or Channel 4. These should not be 
determined by an unaccountable bureaucracy, but by ministers accountable to Parliament. […] So with 
a Conservative Government, Ofcom as we know it will cease to exist. Its remit will be restricted to its 
narrow technical and enforcement roles. It will no longer play a role in making policy. And the policy-
making functions it has today will be transferred back fully to the Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport. (Anon. 2009)  
 
At that time I was a senior executive at Ofcom responsible for the Content and Standards 
Group, which enforced the statutory regulation of broadcast content. I had known David 
Cameron socially when he was a Special Adviser to John Major’s Conservative Government 
and professionally when he worked for Carlton Communications which was a broadcaster 
and a shareholder in the British broadcast news provider, ITN, where I was, at the time, 
Editor-in-Chief. I was therefore asked by Ofcom colleagues what I thought were the motives 
behind this new Conservative position. I offered four possible explanations: 
 
 At Carlton, Cameron would have been frustrated dealing with the then regulator, the 
Independent Television Commission. 
 Since the speech was mostly about cutting back regulation Ofcom may have been 
singled out simply because it was one of the best known regulators. 
 He regarded Ofcom as a creation of the Labour Party and its Chief Executive, Ed 
Richards, had previously worked for Blair and his successor as Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown. 
 Cameron might have been telling News Corporation what they wanted to hear about 
Ofcom. 
 
The next month, August 2009, James Murdoch told the Edinburgh Television Festival that ‘a 
radical reorientation of the regulatory approach is necessary if dynamism and innovation is 
going to be central to the UK media industry’ (Murdoch 2009: 7). Conservative and Murdoch 
policy now appeared to be in tandem. Just one month later, on 30 September 2009, The Sun 
switched its allegiance from Brown’s Labour to Cameron’s Conservatives.15 In the General 
Election a year and a half later, the Conservatives were the largest party but needed a 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats to achieve a working majority in Parliament. 
 
The Cameron Strategy Number Two: The regulator is a solution 
If winning The Sun’s support and the subsequent election success were to be the highpoints 
of whatever it was that brought Cameron and the Murdochs together in a common policy 
focus, the next two years, 2010 and 2011, were to witness an extraordinary change of 
direction. 
The cause was a toxic combination of Murdoch’s ambition to grow his media 
business even more and the misdemeanours within one of his British newspapers. And the 
implications were significant for Ofcom. The regulator that had seemed to be part of a 
problem now became a part of a solution. 
First, the ‘public interest test’, which Labour had agreed to insert into the 2003 
Communications Act, was used by Cameron’s Government to inquire into News 
Corporation’s bid to acquire the 60.9 per cent of BSkyB that it did not already own. Ofcom 
was set to work. The Ofcom process and the subsequent processes lasted a year and a half 
and were due to end with clearance for the bid when what had become known as the ‘phone-
hacking’ affair climaxed. It was confirmed that reporters from the News of the World 
newspaper had hacked into the voicemail of a 13-year-old girl Millie Dowler while she was 
missing and feared murdered. She was later found dead. 
Over the next two weeks after this revelation, parliamentarians of all parties 
condemned the News of the World, Rupert Murdoch closed down the paper, News 
Corporation withdrew its bid for all of BSkyB, and David Cameron announced an inquiry 
into the standards of the press to be chaired by a judge, Lord Justice Leveson. He admitted to 
the House of Commons Liaison Committee that he had allowed himself to get ‘too close’ to 
media proprietors and editors (House of Liaisons Committee 2011). 
Ofcom then used its powers to announce that: ‘In the light of the current public debate 
about phone hacking and other allegations, Ofcom confirms that it has a duty to be satisfied 
on an ongoing basis that the holder of a broadcasting licence is “fit and proper”’ (Ofcom 
2011). In other words the phone-hacking affair threatened to damage Rupert Murdoch’s 
broadcasting business in the United Kingdom as well as his newspaper business, and Ofcom 
had the final say. 
A further irony came when the Minister for the Media, Jeremy Hunt, was accused by 
political opponents of being ‘the Minister for Murdoch’ and favouring News Corporation 
during his handling of the BSkyB process (Anon. 2012). At one point, when Hunt heard that 
the bid had received clearance from the European authorities on competition grounds, he 
texted James Murdoch ‘congrats on Brussels, just Ofcom to go!’ a reference to the final 
clearance which the UK regulator would need to give.
16
 This positive tone contrasted with the 
neutral ‘quasi-judicial’ stewardship that Hunt was required to give when he took over 
responsibility for handling the bid. Hunt’s defence – repeated no less than three times during 
the Leveson Inquiry – was, ‘I was getting independent advice from Ofcom and the OFT 
(Office of Fair Trading), so I was going to wait until I heard from them before I made my 
decision’ (Leveson Inquiry 2012d: 46). 
Hunt’s ability to cite the independence of Ofcom in this process arguably helped save 
his political career. Hunt also asked Ofcom to take on a role that gave him further future 
distance from News Corporation. He asked the regulator to ‘undertake some work into the 
feasibility of measuring media plurality across platforms and recommend the best approach’ 
(Department for Culture Media and Sport 2011). 
In Ofcom’s response, published nine months later, the phrase ‘this is all very difficult’ 
never actually appeared but many technocratic equivalents did (Ofcom 2012).
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 Ofcom 
suggested a review of plurality every four or five years using a ‘basket’ of different measures 
of plurality but with no prohibition of market share. On the issue of what is sufficient 
plurality, Ofcom was happy to point out that ‘Parliament may wish to provide further 
guidance’.  
The net effect of the review was that Ofcom helped the Government put the media 
plurality issue to bed for a few years. It was perhaps not surprising that the Prime Minister 
wanted to keep his distance from decisions involving media groups. His former head of 
communications, Andy Coulson, previously a Murdoch editor, has been charged with 
perjury.
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 A close personal friend, Rebekah Brooks, another former Murdoch editor who 
texted him that ‘professionally we are in this together’, had been charged with conspiracy to 
pervert the course of justice.
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A deal or not a deal 
In his evidence to the Leveson Inquiry the former Labour Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, 
alleged that there was a direct connection between the Murdoch agenda, as set out in James 
Murdoch’s MacTaggart lecture, and what became Conservative policy. 
 
So the BBC licence fee was to be cut, they were to be taken out of much of the work on the Internet, 
their commercial activities were to be reduced, Ofcom was to be neutered, the listing of sporting 
occasions was to benefit News International, product placement was to be allowed […] I think what 
became a problem for us was that on every one of these single issues, the Conservative Party went 
along with the policy, whereas we were trying to defend what I believe was the public interest. 
(Leveson Inquiry 2012d: 38) 
 
At Leveson, David Cameron’s response was,  
 
there was no covert deal, there were no nods and winks. There was a Conservative politician, me, 
trying to win over newspapers, trying to win over television, trying to win over proprietors, but not 
trading policies for that support. And when you look at the detail of this, as I say, it is complete 
nonsense. (Leveson Inquiry 2012e: 88) 
 
So what then lay behind his speech about Ofcom in 2009? Cameron chose to recall his days 
as the Director of Corporate Affairs at Carlton Communications. 
 
One of the reasons I picked Ofcom was because of my own experience from television of remembering 
what the Independent Television Commission had done, the ITC, the precursor of Ofcom, and also 
remembering the sort of levels of pay that there were in the ITC compared with Ofcom, and I did think 
Ofcom was quite a good example of a quango that had got too big, too expensive, and the pay levels 
were pretty excessive.[...] At this time Ofcom was actually being roundly attacked on this basis by ITV, 
by the BBC, with which it had almost nothing to do, and also by commentators on the left of politics 
like Andrew Rawnsley, who were all saying Ofcom seems to have got too big and too bureaucratic. 
(Leveson Inquiry 2012: 93) 
 
Analysis of the commentaries which Andrew Rawnsley wrote in The Observer newspaper 
reveals just one relevant mention of Ofcom, in March 2008, in an article called the ‘swollen 
quangocracy’. Rawnsley’s charge against Ofcom was very specific: 
 
Visitors to the plush citadel which houses Ofcom, the broadcasting regulator, are surprised to be 
offered bottled mineral water emblazoned with the organisation’s logo. Why does a broadcasting 
regulator need to have its own branded water? Let them drink from the tap. (Rawnsley 2009) 
 
The following week the Finance Director of Ofcom wrote to point out ‘There is only one 
problem with this story – the water in question is tap water in reused bottles’ (Smith 2009). 
Cameron’s evidence to support his allegation of Ofcom being ‘roundly attacked’ is therefore 
slim. So why launch such an attack in 2009? My conclusion now is that the four possible 
explanations which I offered to Ofcom colleagues back then all have some merit. 
 
 It was partly based on his own experiences in commercial television. 
 It did provide a headline example for his attack on ‘quangos’. 
 An attack on a Labour-created quango had particular value. 
 And if News Corporation were to conclude that there was symmetry 
between his views and their views that would have further value. 
 
But what I think I missed and every commentator missed was that although the ‘cease to exist 
as we know it’ line was newsworthy, nothing that Cameron proposed would reduce Ofcom’s 
powers in relation to Murdoch and BSkyB. The changes he outlined would not have 
prevented Ofcom’s intervention in the pay-TV market and did not remove Ofcom’s role in 
the public interest test on media plurality. 
And what happened subsequently when Cameron came to power confirms this 
interpretation. Ofcom’s budget was cut, its staff numbers were reduced, its Chief Executive 
took a pay cut and eight of its powers were removed or amended (Sweney 2010). But none of 
these changes restricted Ofcom in its dealings with News Corporation. 
There was a striking change in tone between the ‘unaccountable bureaucracy’ whose 
‘remit will be restricted to its narrow technical and enforcement roles’ (2009) and the 
organization whose ‘role in monitoring the plurality of media provision for consumers, 
licensing the spectrum in the UK and ruling on breaches of the broadcasting code is essential’ 
(2012). But in matters of substance little changed. It remains open to conjecture whether this 
was always the plan or a scenario dictated by events. 
 
The legacy of ‘Managing Murdoch’  
After three years of extraordinary and unpredictable events, British politicians rediscovered 
the value of regulators as a buffer zone between themselves and news organizations which 
seek to influence their agendas on media policy. The political consensus on ‘reducing 
regulation and red tape’ in British life noticeably did not result in any significant deregulation 
of the media. Government ministers went as far as trying to increase their separation from 
some matters of media policy. 
Cameron told the Leveson Inquiry: ‘One specific proposal which has been debated in 
Parliament and raised in public discourse is removing politicians from decision-making 
positions in respect of media takeovers. I believe that this idea merits further consideration’ 
(Leveson Inquiry 2012h: 19, par. 53). And his Media Minister, Jeremy Hunt, said 
independent regulators could fill the gap vacated by politicians (Leveson Inquiry 2012: 95–
96). 
Perhaps the lessons learned in the United Kingdom will guide governments around 
the world who are faced with influential news organizations which seek to change their 
policies on media issues. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1
 Ofcom, operates under the Communications Act, 2003. It is responsible for regulating the United Kingdom’s 
‘TV and radio sectors, fixed line telecoms, mobiles, postal services, plus the airwaves over which wireless 
devices operate’. For more information see Ofcom’s website, in particular, 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/what-is-ofcom/. 
2
 This responsibility was added by the Postal Services Act, 2011 and Ofcom officially assumed the 
responsibility on 1 October 2011. 
3
 Rt. Hon. Stephen Dorrell MP (Secretary of State for National Heritage), HC Deb, 23 May 1995 (c710): ‘For 
the purposes of consultation, I propose total media market share thresholds at 10 per cent of the national media 
market, 20 per cent of a regional market and 20 per cent of the individual press, radio or television sectors.’ 
4
 See, for instance, Donald Macintyre, ‘MPs bid to scrap limits on control of media’, The Independent, 20 May 
1996, p. 7; Andrew Culf, ‘Murdoch in Fresh Attack on Media Ownership Controls’, The Guardian, 26 October 
1995, p. 9; and David Newell, ‘Bottomley Cuts the Media Cake’, The Times, 24 October 1995. 
5
 It closed on 16 November 1995; see Emily Bell, ‘Murdoch’s Last Laugh’, The Observer, 19 November 1995, 
p. 18. 
6
 See, for instance, Robert Peston, ‘OFT To Scrutinise Newspaper and TV Ownership’, The Independent, 17 
February 1989. 
7
 The Sun, 11 April 1992, front page. At the Leveson Inquiry The Sun’s proprietor, Rupert Murdoch, was asked 
whether he had appreciated the headline. Murdoch said ‘I understand that Mr [Kelvin] Mackenzie [the paper’s 
then editor] said I gave him a terrible bollocking […] I don't remember it. I thought it was a little over 
enthusiastic, but my son, who is here today and was apparently beside me, said I did indeed give him a hell of a 
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